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Ventromedial Prefrontal cortex  
is critical for helping Others  
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Janelle N. Beadle1*, Sergio Paradiso2 and Daniel Tranel3,4
1 Department of Gerontology, University of Nebraska at Omaha, Omaha, NE, United States, 2 Private Practice in Psychiatry 
and Psychotherapy, Catania, Italy, 3 Department of Neurology, Roy J. & Lucille A. Carver College of Medicine, University of 
Iowa, Iowa City, IA, United States, 4 Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA, 
United States
Neurological patients with damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) are 
reported to display reduced empathy toward others in their daily lives in clinical case 
studies. However, the empathic behavior of patients with damage to the vmPFC has 
not been measured experimentally in response to an empathy-eliciting event. This is 
important because characterizing the degree to which patients with damage to the 
vmPFC have lower empathic behavior will allow for the development of targeted inter-
ventions to improve patients’ social skills and in turn will help family members to better 
understand their impairments so they can provide appropriate supports. For the first 
time, we induced empathy using an ecologically-valid empathy induction in neurological 
patients with damage to the vmPFC and measured their empathic emotional responses 
and behavior in real time. Eight neurological patients with focal damage to the vmPFC 
were compared to demographically-matched brain-damaged and healthy comparison 
participants. Patients with damage to the vmPFC gave less money in the empathy con-
dition to a person who was suffering (a confederate) than comparison participants. This 
provides the first direct experimental evidence that the vmPFC is critical for empathic 
behavior toward individuals who are suffering.
Keywords: empathy, ventromedial prefrontal cortex, financial decision making, prosocial behavior, lesion study
inTrODUcTiOn
Daily we encounter people who are suffering—strangers living on the street; friends suffering 
from cancer who can’t pay their hospital bills; family members who have lost their homes to a fire. 
Traditional economic theories purport that we are rational actors who behave in ways that maximize 
our monetary gain, and therefore would be unlikely to donate to others in need (1). Yet, when 
people are asked to make financial decisions in daily life, researchers find that emotion (e.g., anger), 
not just rational thought, impacts our financial decisions toward others (2). A striking example of 
this can be seen in laboratory settings when people play economic decision making games, such as 
the Ultimatum Game (UG). When participants receive an offer that is perceived to be unfair, it is 
thought to elicit anger which in turn leads them to reject that offer, despite the negative financial 
impact of this choice (3).
From a neuroscience perspective, our financial decisions are thought to be guided by interact-
ing brain systems involving cognition, emotion, and decision making (2, 4, 5). In fact, patients 
who have brain damage to a region implicated in decision making, the ventromedial prefrontal 
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cortex (vmPFC), have difficulty making advantageous financial 
decisions (6, 7). In other words, their decisions result in financial 
outcomes that are poorer than that of healthy adults.
Clinical case studies demonstrate that patients with damage 
to the vmPFC have a reduced capacity to make decisions, rang-
ing from minor decisions about choosing a restaurant, to major 
decisions about monetary investments (8–10). Furthermore, 
laboratory-based research studies show that patients with dam-
age to the vmPFC have difficulty on multiple tasks measuring 
financial decision making (6, 11–14, 64). For instance, they have 
difficulty learning which decks are financially advantageous in 
the Iowa Gambling Task, and consequently achieve less overall 
financial gain than healthy comparison participants (11–13). In 
the UG, patients with damage to the vmPFC reject unfair offers 
at a higher rate than healthy comparison participants (6). This 
results in the patients obtaining less money overall than healthy 
adults. Based on these studies, researchers have hypothesized that 
patients’ decision making difficulties may derive from a reduced 
ability to utilize emotional information to guide decision making 
in an advantageous manner, as described by the somatic marker 
hypothesis (15–18).
Despite extensive research on financial decision making 
behavior in patients with damage to the vmPFC, we do not know 
how they behave in financial contexts where they witness another 
person who is suffering. This is an important question because 
many of our financial decisions occur in a social context. For 
example, a family member may need extra financial support if 
they develop a chronic illness, such as dementia. A long tradition 
of psychology and neuroscience research has characterized the 
behavior of healthy adults when they witness another person’s 
suffering (19–21). Research has shown that an antecedent to moti-
vate someone to help another person is a perception or awareness 
that the person is in need of help (22). For instance, while there 
are situations that may evoke empathic joy toward others, such 
as when a best friend gets offered their dream job, this type of 
situation is not likely to elicit help because the person is not in 
need. Furthermore, extensive research has shown that feelings of 
empathy also motivate people to help others when they perceive 
them to be in need (20, 23–26).
Empathy is thought to be made up of two components: 
(1) cognitive—one’s ability to understand others’ thoughts and 
emotions, and (2) emotional—one’s ability to feel compassion 
and sympathy for the person in need or feel similarly to them 
(27). Individuals who experience high levels of empathy tend to 
show greater helping behaviors toward others in need than those 
experiencing low levels of empathy (20). Based on this body of 
research, the empathy-altruism hypothesis was developed which 
purports that empathic emotion is one mechanism for helping 
behavior toward others in need (23, 26).
Functional neuroimaging studies point to a broad network of 
brain regions involved in empathy, such as the vmPFC, amyg-
dala, anterior cingulate, and anterior insula (28–31). Although 
functional neuroimaging studies provide important information 
about brain networks involved in empathy, lesion studies are able 
to determine which regions are critical for empathy to occur. 
There is a growing body of patient studies examining the degree to 
which lesions to regions including the anterior cingulate, insula, 
and amygdala affect empathy [(32–34); for review see Ref. (35)]. 
However, because only a small number of studies have investigated 
these regions using varying methodologies, currently there is no 
conclusive evidence that these regions are critical for empathy. In 
comparison, there is a long history of clinical and experimental 
research implicating the importance of the vmPFC for empathy 
(36–38). Therefore, due to the current state of the literature, we 
chose to focus on the vmPFC, because there is more substantial 
and consistent evidence that it is important for empathy.
Clinical case studies have shown that patients with damage to 
the vmPFC behave in ways that suggest they have reduced empa-
thy toward others (39–41). However, these findings have not yet 
been demonstrated in a controlled, experimental context where 
participants with damage to the vmPFC show lower empathic 
behavior than healthy adults in response to an empathy-eliciting 
context. Furthermore, it has not yet been experimentally tested 
whether participants with damage to the vmPFC have reduced 
awareness of empathic information, reduced empathic emo-
tion, or reductions in both domains in comparison to healthy 
adults. For empathic behavior towards others to occur, it is 
often motivated by both an awareness that the other person is 
in need and the experience of empathic emotion (22). If one or 
both these aspects are missing, the individual may exhibit lower 
empathic behavior. Therefore, assessing both the patients’ aware-
ness of empathic information and their empathic emotion may 
aid in understanding potential motivations for their empathic 
behavior.
The information generated in the present study is crucial in 
designing effective interventions to improve social function-
ing in patients with damage to the vmPFC, because it will help 
clinicians to target the cognitive or emotional domains that are 
reduced in patients with damage to the vmPFC. If only their 
empathic behavior is lower than healthy adults, this can be 
targeted with behaviorally focused social skills training. If they 
are lower on their awareness of perceiving empathic information 
from empathy-eliciting contexts, they could receive training on 
how to determine when a situation is likely to evoke empathy 
in others. If they are lower on feelings of empathy, they could 
receive training on techniques to increase one’s empathy, such as 
imagining what the other person may be feeling. Furthermore, 
this is also important information for the patients’ family and 
caregivers because it will help them to better understand what 
social skills might be most difficult for the patients, so they 
can provide appropriate support. Therefore, the present study 
addresses a gap in the knowledge by experimentally investigating 
empathic behavior, empathic feelings, and awareness of empathic 
information in response to an empathy-eliciting context.
For the first time, the current study directly examines how 
patients with damage to the vmPFC behave in a financial context 
when exposed to someone who is suffering. The study uses a 
novel, ecologically valid empathy induction designed to represent 
a real-world scenario that would be likely to induce empathy. 
Furthermore, converging methods were used to assess empathy 
and financial decision making towards a man who is suffering. 
Specifically, these methods included (1) behavior—measure 
of financial decision making toward a suffering individual, 
(2) emotional response—real time patient self-reports of empathic 
FigUre 1 | Lesion overlap map of patients with damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC). The lesion overlap map of eight patients with damage to the 
vmPFC is shown. Images are presented using radiological convention. Warmer colors indicate greater numbers of patients whose lesions overlap in a particular 
region, whereas cooler colors indicate fewer lesion overlaps. Overlap was greatest bilaterally in the ventromedial prefrontal region, with the cortex and white matter in 
the right vmPFC being involved in all eight patients.
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emotion toward the suffering individual, (3) trait empathy—self-
report assessing general tendency toward empathy in daily life 
completed by the patient (and patients’ family member), and 
(4) theory of mind—ability to accurately understand and assess 
others’ feelings and intentions.
The target group included eight neurological patients with focal 
damage to the vmPFC who were compared to a brain-damaged 
comparison (BDC) group and a healthy, normal comparison (NC) 
group. To reduce demand characteristics, participants were told 
that they would be playing an economic decision making game. 
During the course of the study, there was a neutral condition 
where the participant would overhear their opponent through the 
intercom talking about unemotional events from their day (e.g., 
playing a card game and reading the newspaper). The key target 
empathy induction condition involved the participant overhear-
ing through the intercom system a second opponent discussing 
the anniversary of their son’s death and their grieving process. 
Empathic behavior was measured implicitly by how much money 
they gave to each opponent on the economic game (i.e., empathy 
versus neutral condition). To measure in the moment self-report 
ratings of empathy in response to the empathy induction, par-
ticipants completed a mood questionnaire before and after each 
induction condition. This questionnaire measured empathy, in 
addition to other relevant emotions (e.g., sadness, hostility, jovial-
ity, and personal distress). At the end of the study, participants 
also completed a theory of mind task where they were asked to 
assess the intentions and feelings of others through written sce-
narios. Finally, participants completed a questionnaire measuring 
empathy as a general tendency across the lifespan which was also 
completed by their family members, as a means of corroboration.
It was hypothesized that patients with damage to the vmPFC 
will show significantly lower empathic behavior in response to 
an empathic induction in which they witness another person’s 
suffering than comparison groups. Furthermore, it was hypoth-
esized that patients with damage to the vmPFC will show less 
empathic emotion than comparison participants in response to 
an empathy induction.
MaTerials anD MeThODs
Participants
Target participants included eight patients with focal damage to 
the vmPFC (see Figure 1). These patients were compared to NC 
(N = 8) and BDC (N = 8) groups. Comparison participants were 
matched to the target patients on age, education, gender, and full 
scale intelligence. All groups included five females and three males.
Kruskal–Wallis tests were used to compare age and educa-
tion across the three groups. To compare chronicity between 
the BDC and vmPFC groups, a Mann–Whitney U test was used, 
and a Chi-square test was used to compare the two groups on 
type of etiology. In the present study, there were 19 statisti-
cal tests performed that were not testing a  priori hypotheses. 
Therefore, we applied a false discovery rate correction for these 
tests (false discovery rate level: 0.05). There were no significant 
differences between groups on any of the demographic vari-
ables after the false discovery rate correction was applied [age: 
X(2) =  2.79, p =  0.25, Benjamini–Hochberg p-value =  0.59; 
education: X(2)  =  4.94, p  =  0.08; Benjamini–Hochberg 
p-value = 0.51; chronicity: z(14) = 2.53, p = 0.01, Benjamini–
Hochberg p-value  =  0.19; etiology: X(1)  =  0, p  =  1.00; 
Benjamini–Hochberg p-value = 1.00]. The BDC group included 
individuals with lesions outside of regions that have been previ-
ously implicated as being involved in empathy (Tables 1 and 2). 
TaBle 2 | Neuropsychological characteristics of patients.
group vmPFc iD FsiQ WMi TMT a TMT B
0770 108 113 53 135
1983 108 99 25 42
2352 106 111 28 41
2391 109 104 22 43
2577 84 80 44 148
0318 143 119 24 61
2025 115 111 17 37
3001 109 117 41 70
vmPFC (N = 8) M (SD) 110.3 (16.1) 106.8 (12.6) 31.8 (12.7) 72.1 (44.4)
Median (range) 108.5 (84–143) 111.0 (80–119) 26.5 (17–53) 52.0 (37–148)
BDC (N = 8) M (SD) 107.8 (10.0) 105.1 (18.6) 37.1 (22.1) 86.3 (69.0)
Median (range) 107.0 (97–129) 99.5 (86–133) 31.5 (18–77) 64.5 (30–221)
FSIQ, WAIS-III Full Scale Intelligence Quotient; WMI, WAIS-III Working Memory Index; TMT A, Trail Making Test Part A; TMT B, Trail Making Test; vmPFC, patient with damage to the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex; BDC, brain damaged comparison participant; M, mean; SD, standard deviation.
There were no significant differences between the groups on any of the neuropsychological variables when Mann–Whitney U tests were conducted. Nineteen statistical tests were 
performed that were not testing a priori hypotheses. Consequently, we applied a false discovery rate correction for these 19 tests (false discovery rate level: 0.05). NC group did not 
complete the neuropsychological testing portion of the study.
TaBle 1 | Demographic characteristics of participants.
group vmPFc iD age (range) education (years) chronicity (years) etiology
0770 66–70 16 24 Meningioma resection
1983 46–50 13 14 Hemorrhagic stroke
2352 60–65 14 11 Hemorrhagic stroke (SAH)
2391 60–65 13 10 Meningioma resection
2577 70–75 12 11 Hemorrhagic stroke (SAH)
0318 66–70 14 34 Meningioma resection
2025 56–60 16 14 Hemorrhagic stroke
3001 60–65 14 7 Meningioma resection
vmPFC (N = 8) M (SD) 62.4 (7.9) 14.0 (1.4) 15.6 (9.0) 4 Resection/4 stroke
Median (range) 64.0 (46–70) 14.0 (12–16) 12.5 (7–34)
BDC (N = 8) M (SD) 58.0 (12.2) 13.6 (2.3) 7.0 (4.0) 4 Resection/4 stroke
Median (range) 58.5 (44–75) 13.0 (11–18) 6.5 (3–16)
NC (N = 8) M (SD) 67.3 (7.5) 16.6 (3.0) NA NA
Median (range) 67.5 (57–79) 17.0 (12–20)
Patients with damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex were case-matched on age, gender, education, and WAIS-III Full Scale Intelligence Quotient (FSIQ) to individuals from the 
two comparison groups. Chronicity, years between lesion onset and experimental testing session.
SAH, subarachnoid hemorrhage; vmPFC, patient with damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex; BDC, brain damaged comparison participant; NC, normal comparison 
participant; M, mean; SD, standard deviation; NA, not applicable.
Kruskal–Wallis tests were used to compare age and education across the three groups. Mann–Whitney U test was used to compare chronicity between the BDC and vmPFC 
groups, and a Chi-square test was used to compare the type of etiology. There were no significant differences between groups on any of the demographic variables. Nineteen 
statistical tests were performed that were not testing a priori hypotheses. Consequently, we applied a false discovery rate correction for these 19 tests (false discovery  
rate level: 0.05). (To preserve the confidentiality of the patients who participated in the study, age is presented as a range.)
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In the BDC group, the lesions also excluded regions that have 
been associated with numeracy and valuation. The patients 
in the vmPFC group did not have major impairments in 
intelligence or memory, and they did not have premorbid 
personality disorders (6).1 Mann–Whitney U tests were used 
1 Some of the target participants previously participated in another study from our 
laboratory examining the 1-shot version of the UG in the role of the Responder, the 
person who decides whether to accept or reject the offer. These include patients 1983, 
0770, 0318, 2577, 2352, and 2391. This previous study did not include an empathy 
induction. In the present study, we investigate patients’ responses to an empathy 
induction on the UG in the role of the Proposer, the person who makes the offer.
to compare the vmPFC group to the BDC group on relevant 
neuropsychological variables (WAIS-III Full Scale Intelligence 
Quotient—FSIQ, WAIS-III Working Memory Index—WMI, 
Trail Making Test Part A and B—TMT). There were no signifi-
cant differences between the groups on any of the neuropsycho-
logical variables after the false discovery rate correction was 
applied [FSIQ: z(14) =  0.95, p =  0.34; Benjamini–Hochberg 
p-value  =  0.68; WMI: z(14)  =  0.74, p  =  0.46, Benjamini–
Hochberg p-value  =  0.79; TMT-A: z(14)  =  0.21, p  =  0.83, 
Benjamini–Hochberg p-value  =  0.97; TMT-B: z(14)  =  0.00, 
p = 1.00; Benjamini–Hochberg p-value = 1.00]. This study was 
carried out in accordance with the recommendations of the 
5Beadle et al. Ventromedial Prefrontal Critical for Helping
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Declaration of Helsinki and the University of Iowa Institutional 
Review Board with written informed consent from all subjects. 
All subjects gave written informed consent in accordance with 
the Declaration of Helsinki. The protocol was approved by the 
University of Iowa Institutional Review Board.
experimental Design
The present experiment involved a quasi-experimental, cross-
sec tional design. The independent variables included experimen-
tal condition (neutral, empathy) and participant group (vmPFC 
patients, brain damage comparison patients, and normal, healthy 
adult comparison participants). The study used a within-subjects 
design, and thus all participants received both the neutral and 
empathy experimental conditions.
A novel empathy induction was used to elicit empathy in an 
implicit fashion similar to how empathy is frequently evoked in 
daily life—specifically, hearing another person talk about their 
struggles, frustration, and profound sadness. Participants were 
led to believe that the purpose of the study was to play an eco-
nomic game (the UG) against a series of two opponents through 
an intercom system, with the opponents located in a different 
testing room. In one condition, empathy induction, the participant 
overheard (through the intercom) their opponent discussing the 
recent death of their son with the Research Assistant. In another 
condition (neutral, no empathy induction), the participant over-
heard their opponent discussing neutral, mundane events with 
the Research Assistant (e.g., such as playing cards or eating break-
fast). Each participant underwent both the neutral and empathy 
induction in the same testing session. Due to the small number 
of available patients with damage to the vmPFC, the order of the 
inductions was not counterbalanced. The two opponents were 
actually audio recordings of community theater actors rather 
than real participants. The community theater actors were 
both males in their middle 50’s (chosen for having similar 
voice quality, age, and gender) and the Research Assistant in 
the study was a female in her 20’s. The age of the actors was 
selected to be similar to the age of the patient population in 
this study. Each audio recording was 4.5 min, with an 8-minute 
interval. This induction has effectively elicited empathy in 
healthy adults (42). For additional information on methods and 
pilot induction results see Ref. (43, 44).
empathic Behavior
Empathic behavior was measured as the difference between the 
amount of money offered to the opponent in the UG following 
the empathy induction and the amount offered in the neutral 
condition. In the UG, the participant decided how much to offer 
the opponent out of $10 on each of 20 rounds. The offers were 
summed across the 20 rounds, separately for each condition 
(empathy and neutral).
Momentary empathy and emotional 
responses
Empathy and other relevant emotions were measured through 
self-report momentary, state ratings that took place before 
and after each of the two conditions (neutral and empathy). 
Specifically, participants completed a questionnaire that assessed 
the participants’ momentary (or state level) of empathy, personal 
distress, joviality, hostility, and sadness. Participants were asked 
to respond to the prompt, “Indicate to what extent you feel this 
way right now, that is, at the present moment,” by rating each 
item on a scale from 1 (very slight or not at all) to 5 (extreme). 
This rating scale and prompt were adapted from the Positive 
and Negative Affective Schedule (PANAS) questionnaire (45). 
Furthermore, the items assessing joviality, hostility, and sadness 
were also adapted from this questionnaire and included sadness 
(“sad”; “downhearted”), hostility (“hostile”; “angry”), and joviality 
(“happy”; “joyful”). The items assessing emotional empathy and 
personal distress were drawn from a state measure of emotional 
empathy (23). These items included (“sympathetic”; “compas-
sionate”) and (“upset” and “distressed”). These questionnaires 
have been used in previous research studies to measure state 
empathy, personal distress, and basic emotions in healthy adults 
and patients with brain damage (42, 46).
Patients Thoughts and Feelings about 
empathy induction
We examined written free responses from the participants 
about their thoughts and feelings involving the empathy induc-
tion. This questionnaire was completed at the end of the experi-
ment after the participant had undergone both the neutral and 
empathy conditions, but prior to the debriefing session about 
the purpose of the study. In particular, participants responded 
to a question about their thoughts and feelings in response to 
the empathy induction in which they overheard their second 
opponent in the game talking about the anniversary of their 
son’s death. Specifically the prompt was, “Please describe 
your thoughts and feelings (in a few words or a sentence) 
while hearing your second opponent talk with the Research 
Assistant. Please list these thoughts and feelings next to the 
bullets below. If there is not enough room, please use the lines 
below to describe further.”
These free responses were coded by two raters (research 
assistants) who were blind to the group each participant was 
assigned to as well as the purpose of the study. Responses were 
coded as a “1” if the written text mentioned at least one of the 
following terms: “sorry for,” “sad,” “sympathy/sympathetic,” and/
or “compassion/compassionate.” Responses were coded as a “0” if 
the participant did not reference any of these terms.
Believability/Manipulation check
Participants completed four questions after the experiment, 
measuring the degree to which they believed they were playing 
against real opponents. The rating scale in response to these 
questions ranged from 1  =  did not believe to 5  =  believed 
extremely. These questions included the following: (1) “Did you 
believe that the first conversation you heard was a conversation 
between a Research Assistant and another person participating 
in the study?” (2) “Did you believe that the second conversation 
you heard was a conversation between a Research Assistant and 
another person participating in the study?” (3) “Did you believe 
that the first game was played against another person participating 
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in the study?” (4) “Did you believe that the second game was 
played against another person participating in the study?” The 
responses across these four questions were averaged for each 
participant.
Trait empathy ratings
Participants completed a questionnaire designed to measure 
empathy as a trait, or a general tendency in one’s daily life (27). 
In addition, the participants’ family members also completed 
the same trait questionnaire about the participants, as a means 
of comparison. (Not all family members of the participants 
were available to complete the questionnaires. The final sample 
of family members included a total of 14, across the three 
groups.)
The Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) (27) was used to 
assess trait empathy and is a well-validated, multidimensional 
measure of empathy that assesses both the emotional and cogni-
tive aspects of empathy. Emotional empathy was measured using 
the Empathic Concern subscale and cognitive empathy was 
assessed through the Perspective Taking subscale. Each subscale 
ranges from 0 to 28 points, and higher scores indicate a greater 
tendency towards empathy in daily life. The IRI has adequate test/
retest reliability (range: r = 0.61–0.81) and internal consistency 
(range Cronbach’s alpha: 0.68–0.79). An example item from the 
questionnaire is, “When I’m upset at someone, I usually try to ‘put 
myself in his shoes’ for awhile.”
social Faux Pas Task: assessing accuracy 
of Detecting Others’ intentions
Theory of mind was measured with a standard task assessing 
one’s ability to detect social faux pas from written scenarios, 
called the Social Faux Pas Task (47). In this task, participants 
read written scenarios about two characters engaged in a situ-
ation where someone says or does something that is socially 
inappropriate, or in other words, commits a social faux pas. 
Then, the participant answers a multiple choice question to 
determine whether they can detect what social faux pas was 
committed. In this task, there are also control scenarios to assess 
basic reasoning skills. A separate accuracy score is calculated 
for the 12 control and 12 theory of mind conditions for each 
participant.
statistical analysis
Hypothesis Testing
Our primary variable of interest was the empathic behavior vari-
able. We performed the Shapiro–Wilk test to assess the normal-
ity of the distribution of this variable. We found evidence that 
the NC group was not normally distributed (NC: S-W = 0.81, 
p =  0.04; BDC: S-W =  0.94, p =  0.59; vmPFC: S-W =  0.98, 
p = 0.97), and thus we have used non-parametric tests through-
out this paper. We tested the degree to which the vmPFC group 
had lower empathic behavior than the comparison groups using 
a Kruskal–Wallis test. Next, we assessed the degree to which 
the vmPFC group had lower state empathy ratings than the 
comparison groups using a Kruskal–Wallis test. Based on our 
a  priori hypotheses, planned comparisons (Mann–Whitney U 
tests) were used to compare each group to the other two groups 
on these variables.
Sample Description
The mean and standard deviation of the variables believability, 
trait empathy, theory of mind, and state emotions other than 
empathy (e.g., sadness, personal distress, hostility, and joviality) 
are presented in Table 3. Because we did not have specific hypoth-
eses about these variables, these results are descriptive in nature. 
The exploratory analyses included separate Kruskal–Wallis tests 
to compare the three participant groups on believability, theory 
of mind, trait empathy (patient and family ratings), and each of 
the state emotions (i.e., sadness, personal distress, hostility, and 
joviality). If the result was significant at p < 0.05, Mann–Whitney 
U tests were used to assess differences between the groups. For 
all tests, uncorrected p-values are listed. A total of 19 statistical 
tests were performed that were not testing a priori hypotheses. 
Consequently, we applied a false discovery rate correction for 
these 19 tests (false discovery rate level: 0.05). We also list the 
Benjamini–Hochberg p-value that resulted from this false dis-
covery rate correction. All statistical tests were two-tailed and 
findings were considered to be significant at the p < 0.05 level. 
Nonparametric tests were used for all analyses. For our qualitative 
exploratory analysis of patients’ thoughts and feelings in response 
to the empathy induction, we present the proportion of partici-
pants’ responses from each group that were coded as a 1 and the 
participants’ written responses. Statistics were not conducted 
on the thoughts and feelings responses because the results were 
qualitative in content.
resUlTs
hypothesis Testing
Primary Behavioral Analysis: Empathic Behavior 
Towards a Suffering Individual
The primary analysis addressed the degree to which participants 
demonstrated empathy behaviorally by making larger offers in 
the UG in response to the empathy condition in comparison 
to the neutral condition. Patients with damage to the vmPFC 
did not make higher offers in the empathy condition than in 
the neutral condition, whereas both comparison groups made 
much higher offers [Figure 2A, group: X(2) = 9.56, p = 0.008; 
follow-up planned comparisons: vmPFC vs. BDC: z(14) = 2.73, 
p = 0.006; vmPFC vs. NC: z(14) = 2.37, p = 0.02; BDC vs. NC: 
z(14) = 1.06, p = 0.29]. The range of offers in each group included: 
vmPFC = −$8 to 8.672; BDC = $2 to 24; NC = $3 to 16. In fact, 
of the eight vmPFC patients, four patients actually gave lower 
offers to the man who had lost his son, two had virtually zero 
change, and two had increases in response to the empathy con-
dition. In sharp contrast, all 16 participants in the comparison 
groups gave higher offers in response to the empathy induction; 
in many instances, these were much higher (Figure 2A; Figure S1 
in Supplementary Material for additional information).
2 A fraction is indicated here because one patient with damage to the vmPFC was 
missing one offer, and thus a mean substitution approach was used to approximate 
the missing value based on the patient’s other offers.
TaBle 3 | Assessments of state emotion, empathy, and theory of mind.
vmPFc BDc nc p-value
M (sD) Median (range) M (sD) Median (range) M (sD) Median (range)
state emotion ratings
Empathy 0.9 (1.0) 0.8 (0–3) 2.0 (1.4) 2.0 (0–4) 1.8 (1.3) 2.3 (0–3) 0.21
Sadness 0.6 (0.4) 0.8 (0–1) 1.2 (1.0) 1.0 (0–2.5) 0.5 (0.6) 0.3 (0–1.5) 0.24
Personal distress 0.3 (0.3) 0.3 (0–0.5) 0.1 (0.5) 0 (−0.5–1) 0.2 (0.6) 0 (−0.5–1.5) 0.65
Hostility −0.2 (0.4) 0 (−1–0) 0 (0) 0 (0–0) 0 (0) 0 (0–0) 0.12
Joviality −0.3 (0.8) 0 (−1.5–0.5) −0.6 (0.9) −0.5 (−2.5–0.5) −0.8 (0.9) −0.5 (−2.5–0) 0.57
Trait empathy ratings
IRI-Perspective Taking (cognitive empathy)
Participants 18.5 (3.7) 18.0 (14–26) 19.8 (4.5) 20.0 (14–26) 17.1 (3.8) 17.0 (12–24) 0.52
Family 14.0 (6.8) 12.5 (8–27) 16.3 (3.9) 16.5 (12–20) 20.0 (2.6) 20.0 (17–23) 0.14
Difference score −4.5 (8.0) −3.0 (−16–7) −1.8 (6.4) −1.0 (−10–5) 1.5 (3.7) 0 (−1–7) 0.27
IRI-Empathic Concern (emotional empathy)
Participants 22.1 (3.9) 23.0 (14–26) 20.6 (4.5) 20.0 (15–28) 23.5 (2.0) 23.0 (20–27) 0.36
Family 19.2 (5.5) 18.5 (13–26) 19.0 (2.9) 18.5 (16–23) 23.8 (4.0) 25.0 (18–27) 0.21
Difference score −2.8 (4.6) −1.8 (−11–3) −1.8 (5.0) 0 (−9–2) −0.5 (3.9) 0.5 (−6–3) 0.55
Theory of mind task: accuracy (%)
Theory of mind 82.3 (14.4) 87.5 (50–91.7) 62.5 (19.4) 62.5 (33.3–91.7) 83.3 (6.3) 83.3 (75–92) 0.05 
Control 77.1 (13.2) 70.8 (66.7–100) 80.2 (12.5) 83.3 (66.7–100.0) 83.3 (8.9) 83.3 (75–100) 0.58
Group labels include: vmPFC, ventromedial prefrontal cortex; BDC, group of patients with damage to areas of the brain not related to empathy; NC, healthy adult normal 
comparison group; M, mean; SD, standard deviation. State emotion rating change scores represent the effect of the empathy induction on each emotional state by subtracting 
out their emotional response to the neutral condition and their baseline response. IRI, Interpersonal Reactivity Index. Participants indicates participants’ self-reported score on the 
questionnaire. Family indicates family member ratings of the participant. Difference score indicates participant score was subtracted from family member score—negative scores 
indicate family member rated the participant lower than the participant rated themselves; positive scores indicate family member rated the participant higher than the participant 
rated themselves. Theory of mind task represents accuracy on the theory of mind condition, control indicates accuracy on the control condition. Kruskal–Wallis tests were used  
to compare the three groups on each measure. Because the state empathy rating examined a specific hypothesis, planned comparison tests were used, with no correction.  
Nineteen statistical tests were performed that were not testing a priori hypotheses. Consequently, we applied a false discovery rate correction for these 19 tests (false discovery 
rate level: 0.05).
FigUre 2 | Group differences in empathic behavior, ratings, and believability. The three participant groups were compared on their empathic behavior, ratings, and 
the believability of the experiment. Graphs depict mean values and error bars are standard error of the mean. *p < 0.05. N.S., not significant. (a) Empathic behavior 
by group. Empathic behavior on the Ultimatum Game (UG) was depicted as a change score reflecting the difference in the amount of money given after experiencing 
an empathy or neutral condition (sum of offers: empathy – neutral condition). Positive numbers indicate that greater money was given in response to the empathy 
induction than the neutral condition. (B) Empathy ratings by group. An empathy rating change score was computed measuring empathic concern ratings before 
and after each induction condition: (After – Before Empathy Induction) – (After – Before Neutral Induction). Positive change scores indicate higher ratings on the 
empathy induction versus the neutral condition. (c) Believability. Participants completed four questions at the end of the experiment measuring the degree to which 
they believed they were playing against real opponents. Responses across the four questions were averaged. (Rating scale: 1–5; 1 = did not believe and 
5 = believed extremely.) Nineteen statistical tests were performed that were not testing a priori hypotheses. Consequently, we applied a false discovery rate 
correction for these 19 tests (false discovery rate level: 0.05).
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TaBle 4 | Written free responses about empathy induction by patients with 
damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC).
770 “He seemed to be an ordinary person well-adjusted until he started 
talking about the death of son and it made me feel sorry until he 
said the death was not his fault and he did have ideas of how to 
overcome his loss and I feel he is in control and things will improve 
as time goes on.”
1983 “Again, why are they doing research? How old is this person? Did they 
have some kind of brain trauma? Do they wonder about me?”
2352 “Sad person since son’s death; could not connect with wife’s feelings 
now; desperately looking for help.”
2391 “Sympathy for losing a loved one; compassion for what he is 
experiencing. My brother died on [excluded for confidentiality]. I have 
experienced the death of a loved one, so I can relate to how he is 
feeling. He has a long way to go before his son’s death won’t hurt.”
2577 “Sadness with loss of loved one.”
318 “He is emotional, sad, articulate. He articulates and evaluates such 
strong emotion very well.”
2025 “I’ve never played bridge. How extremely sad that son died. I’d like to 
suggest he find a support group.”
3001 “He is not dealing well with the loss of his son. He is trying to get 
beyond the loss of his son. This loss is effecting him daily. I feel 
compassion for him and his wife.”
Participants with damage to the vmPFC filled out a questionnaire after the experiment 
was completed about their thoughts and feelings in response to the audio recording 
designed to induce empathy. Specifically, participants responded to the prompt: 
“Please describe your thoughts and feelings (in a few words or a sentence) while 
hearing your second opponent talk with the Research Assistant. Please list these 
thoughts and feelings next to the bullets below. If there is not enough room, please use 
the lines below to describe further.” We list the written comments of each participant 
with damage to the vmPFC.
8
Beadle et al. Ventromedial Prefrontal Critical for Helping
Frontiers in Neurology | www.frontiersin.org May 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 288
Emotional Response: State Empathy
We compared the degree to which there were differences in state 
self-rated empathy in response to the experimental conditions 
across the three groups. Overall, group differences were not 
significant (Figure 2B; Table 3, X(2) = 3.11, p = 0.21). Follow-up 
planned comparisons revealed that the vmPFC group did not 
significantly differ from the BDC group [z(14) = 1.70, p = 0.09] 
or from the NC group [z(14) = 1.23, p = 0.22]. Also, the BDC and 
NC groups did not differ significantly [z(14) = 0.43, p = 0.67].
We tested the degree to which the state empathy of the three 
groups was statistically equivalent using the two one-sided tests 
(TOST) procedure (48), with an alpha level of 0.05 and an effect 
size value of Cohen’s d = 0.3 (indicating a small effect size). When 
comparing the vmPFC group to the BDC group, the equivalence 
test was non-significant [t(12.54) = 1.31, p = 0.89]. When compar-
ing the vmPFC group to the NC group, the equivalence test also 
was non-significant [t(13.08) = 0.97, p = 0.83]. When comparing 
the BDC group to the NC group, the equivalence test was non-
significant [t(13.90) = −0.22, p = 0.42]. Although there were no 
statistically significant differences between the groups on this 
measure, our study’s small sample size prevented us from estab-
lishing statistically significant equivalence between the groups.
exploratory analyses
Patients Thoughts and Feelings About  
Empathy Induction
We sought to further understand the degree to which patients 
were aware that the content of the empathy induction was about 
an empathy-eliciting situation. To further assess this question, 
we examined written free responses from the participants in 
response to a questionnaire that occurred at the end of the 
experiment, but prior to the debriefing session about the purpose 
of the study. In particular, participants responded to a question 
about their thoughts and feelings in response to the empathy 
induction in which they overheard their second opponent in 
the game talking about the anniversary of their son’s death. 
Specifically, the prompt was, “Please describe your thoughts 
and feelings (in a few words or a sentence) while hearing your 
second opponent talk with the Research Assistant. Please list 
these thoughts and feelings next to the bullets below. If there is 
not enough room, please use the lines below to describe further.” 
We present the full written responses of the patients with dam-
age to the vmPFC in Table 4. The full written responses of the 
BDC and NC groups are presented in Table S1 in Supplementary 
Material.
Two raters who were blind to the group each participant was 
assigned to as well as the purpose of the study coded the written 
free responses of the participants. Responses were coded as a “1” 
if the written text mentioned at least one of the following terms: 
“sorry for,” “sad,” “sympathy/sympathetic,” and/or “compassion/
compassionate.” Responses were coded as a “0” if the participant 
did not reference any of these terms. In the group of patients with 
damage to the vmPFC, seven out of the eight patients’ responses 
were coded as a “1” in response to the empathy condition. Similarly, 
in the BDC group, seven out of the eight patients’ responses were 
coded as a “1” and in the NC group, all eight participants were 
coded as a “1.” (There was perfect agreement among the raters in 
their coding of the written responses). Some examples of the free 
responses of the patients with damage to the vmPFC are, “Sad 
person since son’s death; could not connect with wife’s feelings 
now; desperately looking for help,” and, “Sympathy for losing a 
loved one; compassion for what he is experiencing.”
Manipulation Check
A manipulation check was used to determine the degree to 
which participants believed the experiment (i.e., whether par-
ticipants believed that the opponents they overheard during 
the experiment through the intercom were actual participants). 
This manipulation check demonstrated that the groups did not 
significantly differ on the believability measure [X(2) =  0.87, 
p = 0.65; Benjamini–Hochberg p-value = 0.82]. For additional 
information about the believability results and questionnaire, see 
Figure 2C and Section “Materials and Methods.”
State Emotion
There were no significant group differences after a false discovery 
rate correction in any of the emotions measured in response to 
the experimental conditions which included sadness, personal 
distress, hostility, and joviality [sadness: X(2) = 2.87, p = 0.24; 
Benjamini–Hochberg p-value  =  0.59; personal distress: 
X(2) = 0.87, p = 0.65, Benjamini–Hochberg p-value = 0.97; hosti-
lity: X(2) = 4.17, p = 0.12, Benjamini–Hochberg p-value = 0.53; jovi-
ality: X(2) = 1.12, p = 0.57, Benjamini–Hochberg p-value = 0.79; 
(Table 3)].
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Trait Empathy and Accuracy of Assessing Others’ 
Intentions
Groups were compared on their self-reported trait empathy 
(cognitive—IRI Perspective Taking subscale; emotional—IRI 
Empathic Concern subscale), and their theory of mind perfor-
mance (Table 3; see Materials and Methods). In addition, family 
members completed the trait questionnaire about the participants, 
as a means of comparison. This analysis revealed no significant 
differences between the groups in self-reported trait empathy 
by the participants after false discovery rate correction [IRI-EC: 
X(2) = 2.07, p = 0.36; Benjamini–Hochberg p-value = 0.68; IRI-PT: 
X(2)  =  1.31, p  =  0.52, Benjamini–Hochberg p-value  =  0.79]. 
There were also no significant differences between the groups 
after false discovery rate correction in family members’ reports of 
participants’ trait empathy [Table 3; IRI-EC: X(2) = 3.16, p = 0.21, 
Benjamini–Hochberg p-value = 0.59; IRI-PT: X(2) = 3.89, p = 0.14, 
Benjamini–Hochberg p-value = 0.53].
Next, the groups were compared on their accuracy scores in 
the theory of mind task (Social Faux Pas Task) which measures 
one’s ability to detect the motivations and intentions of others 
through written scenarios. This task includes a theory of mind 
condition (i.e., accuracy of determining others’ intentions) and 
a control condition (i.e., accuracy of basic reasoning skills). 
When comparing the performance accuracy of the groups on 
the theory of mind condition, there was no significant effect 
of group after correction for false discover rate [Theory of 
mind condition: X(2) =  5.82, p =  0.05, Benjamini–Hochberg 
p-value = 0.48]. There were also no significant group differences 
in the control condition after correction for false discovery rate 
[Control condition: X(2) = 1.11, p = 0.58, Benjamini–Hochberg 
p-value = 0.79].
DiscUssiOn
For the first time, we experimentally demonstrated that patients 
with damage to the vmPFC behaved with little empathy in a 
financial context towards a man who is suffering. This cor-
roborates clinical case studies reporting that patients with 
damage to the vmPFC behave with reduced empathy toward 
family members (40, 41, 49). Furthermore, we also advance 
the literature by demonstrating that patients with damage to 
the vmPFC obtained more money than comparison groups 
in the UG when witnessing another person suffering. This is 
in contrast to previous studies which found that patients with 
damage to the vmPFC achieved poorer financial outcomes than 
comparison participants in decision making games, such as the 
Iowa Gambling Task (11, 12). The findings of the present study 
are consistent with research suggesting that the vmPFC plays 
an important role in using contextual information to guide 
decision making (50, 51).
Patients with damage to the vmPFC showed significantly 
less empathic behavior towards a person who was suffering. 
Specifically, the patients with damage to the vmPFC did not give 
more money to the man who was suffering than to the man in the 
control condition. In stark contrast, the comparison groups gave 
more money to the man who was suffering than to the man in the 
control condition. However, behaving with less empathic behav-
ior than the comparison groups actually benefited the patients 
with damage to the vmPFC financially, as they received higher 
rather than lower financial payoffs than comparison participants.
Determining whether a financial decision is advantageous or 
not depends not only on the financial outcome, but also on the 
social consequences that may result. For instance, imagine the 
situation in which your mother cannot afford her chemotherapy 
treatments. You decide to help pay for her chemotherapy treat-
ments, even though this decision could negatively impact your 
financial situation out of concern for her well-being which 
may in turn result in increased relationship quality. Therefore, 
healthy adults may choose to forego financial gain in order to 
achieve greater social rewards. On the other hand, imagine if an 
individual acted in a manner similar to the patients with vmPFC 
damage in the current study where they decided to pay very little 
for the chemotherapy treatments. Although this would result in 
better financial outcomes for the patient, it could severely and 
negatively impact their relationship with their mother. Therefore, 
advantageous financial decision making in social contexts is 
likely to require making decisions that are likely to facilitate social 
relationships, even if finances are negatively impacted.
The lower empathic behavior of patients with damage to the 
vmPFC in the present study may contribute to their difficulties 
making and maintaining relationships that are often highlighted 
in case reports (8, 9, 52). Anderson and colleagues studied two 
cases of patients with damage to the vmPFC and noticed that 
they both had few friends, mentioning that in the case of Patient 
B the, “lack of friends was conspicuous,” (52). Furthermore, 
there is other anecdotal evidence that patients with damage to 
the vmPFC have difficulty maintaining relationships, such as in 
the case of seminal patient EVR, who went through a divorce after 
17 years of marriage (8), and in another case study of a patient 
who had already been divorced by 21 years of age (9). Because of 
the important role of empathic behavior in maintaining and nur-
turing relationships, it is likely that difficulty showing empathic 
behavior toward others could have a negative impact on one’s 
personal relationships.
The results in the present study also provide new information 
about how patients with damage to the vmPFC perceive and 
experience empathy-eliciting situations. We report that patients 
with damage to the vmPFC did not significantly differ from 
the comparison groups in their experience of “in the moment” 
empathy in response to an empathy induction involving exposure 
to another person’s suffering. However, it should be noted that our 
study’s small sample size prevented us from establishing statisti-
cally significant equivalence between the groups. Consequently, 
at this time, we cannot determine whether the patients with dam-
age to the vmPFC have lower or equivalent levels of state empathy 
relative to the comparison groups. Our exploratory free response 
analyses suggest that the majority of patients with damage to the 
vmPFC are aware that they were exposed to an empathy-eliciting 
situation, as seven out of the eight patients reported that they felt 
“sorry for,” “sad,” “sympathy/sympathetic,” and/or “compassion/
compassionate” in response to the empathy induction. However, 
we note that despite this reported awareness of the empathic 
content, this was not sufficient for the patients with damage to 
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the vmPFC to behave in an empathic manner. Taken together, 
our findings suggest that future studies are needed to tease apart 
this important question as to whether patients with damage to the 
vmPFC have lower state empathy than healthy adults in response 
to empathy-eliciting events.
The patients with damage to the vmPFC in our sample did not 
significantly differ from the comparison groups in their ability 
to accurately detect the intentions of others in a separate theory 
of mind task. A previous study of patients with damage to the 
vmPFC focused on patients’ reports of trait empathy and found 
that there is evidence for lower reported cognitive empathy than 
healthy adults of comparable demographics (38). However, a key 
difference between the present study and study by Shamay-Tsoory 
and colleagues is that their sample of patients with damage to the 
vmPFC included a large proportion of closed head injury cases 
which could have had more diffuse brain damage. In contrast, 
the present sample does not include any closed head injury cases. 
Furthermore, in the present study, we did not find significant 
group differences in accuracy on the theory of mind task which 
would provide further support that their ability to discern others’ 
intentions is relatively intact. Previous studies of theory of mind 
in patients with damage to the vmPFC have found mixed evidence 
about whether they have difficulty detecting others’ intentions 
and motivations (53, 54).
It is relevant to discuss our findings in the context of important 
theories of vmPFC function [for review see Ref. (55)]. The somatic 
marker hypothesis proposes the role of the vmPFC as a secondary 
inducer, or a higher order emotional response that helps to guide 
decision making (17, 18). Roy and colleagues highlight an impor-
tant role for the vmPFC in affective meaning (56). In particular, 
they suggest that the vmPFC plays a role in behavioral responses 
to higher order conceptual levels of emotion, rather than lower 
order simple emotional responses (56). The role for the vmPFC in 
insight and reflection has also been pointed out by Koenigs et al. 
(57) who suggested that this region plays an important function 
in reflecting on one’s emotional state and how it may affect others. 
Our results suggest that the vmPFC is important for behaving in 
an empathic manner in response to a financial context in which 
another person is suffering. We find preliminary evidence that 
despite seven out of eight patients reporting that they are aware 
of the empathic context, they did not show empathic behavior, 
suggesting that they have difficulty using this type of information 
to guide their empathic behavior.
In the financial domain, previous studies have established that 
the vmPFC is critical for advantageous financial decisions, whether 
in the context of the Iowa Gambling Task (15, 16), or the UG (57). 
In both cases, patients with vmPFC damage act differently than 
normal healthy adults, and fail to use emotional information in 
an advantageous way to guide financial behavior. In the present 
study, the patients with damage to the vmPFC appear to be aware 
of the empathy-eliciting context but behave with lower empathy 
than the comparison groups. However, as a result, they also have 
greater payoffs in the game. Consequently, it suggests that the 
vmPFC may be important for using contextual information in a 
socially advantageous manner, such as showing empathy toward 
others in need, or regulating one’s anger when someone rejects 
your offers in the UG. This interpretation is in line with Koenigs 
et  al.’s (57) discussion of the important role for the vmPFC in 
self-reflection about one’s emotions and the consequences of their 
behavior. Although the present study focuses on the financial 
domain, the vmPFC may serve similar functions in non-financial 
contexts. This is seen in their failure to use emotional context in 
a socially advantageous manner in moral scenarios, as patients 
with vmPFC damage exhibit utilitarian type behavior (58) and 
socially inappropriate behaviors (59). In summary, the present 
study adds to the growing literature on the role of the vmPFC in 
social decision making in financial and non-financial contexts.
This study has limitations. The measure of empathic feelings 
in this study was self-report which can be influenced by concerns 
for social desirability. To attempt to address this issue, we also 
collected ratings from the family members about the patients’ 
empathy, as a form of corroboration. We found that the family 
members’ ratings did not significantly differ across the participant 
groups, which provides support for the accuracy of the patient 
ratings. In the present study, we cannot directly address the ques-
tion of whether the empathy that the patients with damage to the 
vmPFC felt in response to the empathy induction was similar to 
or more extreme than the level of empathy they may experience 
in their daily lives. To answer this question, future studies may 
compare patient ratings of empathy in real time in their daily lives 
vs. laboratory-based empathy inductions. Because patients with 
focal damage to the vmPFC are rare, our sample size is smaller 
than that of studies focusing on healthy adults. However, the size 
of our sample is consistent with other studies on patients with 
damage to the vmPFC [e.g., N =  7, (6); N =  8, (58)]. Because 
the inductions were not counterbalanced in the present study, 
there is the possibility of an order effect. In a different study of 
healthy younger and older adults, we counterbalanced the order 
of a similar empathy induction and neutral induction (this one 
used a series of notes rather than audio recordings) and found 
no significant effects of order. This suggests that in a similar 
context, there was no significant effect of order (46). However, 
in future studies, it would be useful to counterbalance the order 
of the conditions in order to specifically address this limitation. 
Characterization of the patients’ emotional responses to empathy 
inductions through physiological (e.g., skin conductance, heart 
rate) measures would further add to our understanding of their 
momentary empathic experience in response to others’ suffering.
In summary, the current study is the first to experimentally 
demonstrate that the vmPFC is critical for empathic behavior in 
a financial context towards those who are suffering. We show pre-
liminary evidence that awareness of an empathy-eliciting event, 
where someone is suffering, is not enough to elicit empathic 
behavior in patients with damage to the vmPFC. Rather, it sug-
gests that these patients do not appear to use this information 
to guide their behavior in a way that helps the suffering person. 
On the other hand, by behaving in a manner seemingly not 
influenced by the empathic context, patients with damage to the 
vmPFC have better financial payoffs than the comparison groups.
These findings have broad implications for the treatment of 
other populations suffering from difficulty behaving with empa-
thy toward others who are suffering. It helps us understand how 
groups affected by changes to the frontal lobe might respond in 
financial contexts where they witness another person’s suffering. 
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Because decreased functioning of the frontal lobe is seen in many 
different populations ranging from healthy aging, to dementia, 
and brain injury, it has far reaching implications for financial 
decision making in social contexts for these groups (60). This 
is important for family members of patients with damage to 
the frontal lobe to be aware of because it may help them to have 
greater compassion for the patient.
In contrast to the behavior of the patients with damage to the 
vmPFC, if an individual puts too much weight on the emotional 
context of a situation, it could also have a negative impact on 
financial decisions and personal relationships. For instance, 
highly empathic caregivers or nurses may become too emotion-
ally invested in their patients or loved ones which could lead to 
compassion fatigue and burnout (61–63). In future research stud-
ies, it would be useful to investigate the utility of interventions 
designed to help individuals strategize about making financial 
decisions that optimize both financial and social well-being. In 
conclusion, the present study characterizes the role of the vmPFC 
in an empathy-eliciting situation involving financial decision 
making towards an individual who is suffering.
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